This paper provides estimates of price-marginal cost ratios for manufacturing and services sectors in the Eurozone, the US and Japan over the period 1970-2007. The estimates are obtained applying τhe methodology developed by Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger (1995) on the EU KLEMS March 2011 database. The major stylized facts that are emerged from the empirical results based on the Ordinary Least Squares, Two Step Least Squares and Bootstrap methods of estimation are a) there is no evidence of imperfect competition across the majority of industries in Eurozone, US and Japan, b) sectors that are more open to internationalisation, experience relatively lower mark up ratios than the ratios experienced in less open sectors to internationalisation and c) deregulated industries generally have lower mark -up ratios than regulated industries, while fragmented industries generally exhibit higher mark -up ratios than segmented ones.
Introduction
Estimating the degree of competition in an industry is crucial for regulatory and competition authorities as well as the policy-makers. Regulators would like to know whether current regulation is conducive to competition. Likewise, competition authorities might gauge the current competitive situation in a sector (Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 2012) .
As a consequence, boosting competition in the markets for goods and services is a growing economic policy concern, as evidenced by the policies employed by the European Commission and the OECD. Specifically, the European Commission, has recently announced its intention to amend the competition law legislation by fine tuning certain regulatory measures (i.e EC merger regulation, leniency program, application of State aid rules, etc) in order to facilitate competitive conditions across the member states.
It is noteworthy, that competition, inter alia, enhances economic activity and increases the level of employment by improving purchasing power and spurring firms to innovate. In this context, there is a need for structural indicators allowing the researchers and the government officials to identify clearly those sectors of the economy for which competition could be increased. Among the most commonly used indicators are the degree of market concentration in the sector, such as HHI and CR 4 indexes, and the degree of sectoral regulation. However, these indicators do not always reflect the real degree of competition in a sector (Trėsor-Economics, 2008 ).
An alternative approach is to use national accounts data to infer conclusions about the difference between the selling price (P) and the marginal cost (MC), since the less competition there is in a sector, the more the price can diverge from the marginal production cost. In other words, we can use the ratio between the sale price and the marginal production cost (mark up ratio) in order to gauge the intensity of competition in a sector. As a consequence, mark-up estimates of different sectors and different countries allowing for comparisons of the degree of competition, they should help in identifying which sectors and/or countries would benefit most from changes in legislation or regulation that affect competition.
The approach adopted here is to estimate econometrically the level of market power by following the methodology developed by Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger (1995) . This methodology is based on the hypothesis that in a situation of perfect competition the selling price is equal to marginal cost. The equality of marginal cost and price is essential for the efficiency of the economy since, first, competitive markets can achieve higher productivity levels, and second, competition provides consumers with products of higher quality, increased variety and lower prices (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2013) . However, this condition does not apply in a less competitive environment (i.e oligopoly markets, monopolies), since the price deviates from marginal cost. Therefore, the ratio between the selling price and marginal cost assesses the competitiveness of the market. However, while selling price is directly observable, the marginal production cost is not. This drawback was overcome by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) who both showed that under perfect competition, the nominal growth rate of the Solow residual is independent of the nominal capital productivity growth rate. It then follows that the coefficient linking the nominal growth rate of the Solow residual to the nominal capital productivity growth is the Lerner Index defined as the ratio of the price minus marginal cost to price
).
Despite the voluminous amount of work on the topic, none of these studies -to the best of our knowledge-has examined this relationship for the Eurozone countries. 3 Furthermore, unlike previous studies, we use an array of econometric techniques (OLS, 2SLS and bootstrap methods) to test the robustness of the results. The scope of this paper is that its empirical findings might be used as a benchmark to other European countries in order to asses the degree of competition in certain manufacturing and services sectors.
In this paper, we empirically investigate the market power of the Eurozone, the US and Japan, manufacturing and services industry at a disaggregated level. In particular, the empirical model assesses the extent of the mark -up ratio for each of the subsectors of the two industries over the period . The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, while Section 3 discusses the data and outlines the methodology applied. Section 4 illustrates and evaluates the results of the empirical analysis, while Section 5 depicts some stylized facts. Finally, Section 6 provides some conclusions and policy implications. 3 For the purposes of this paper the Eurozone consists of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
Survey of the literature
The estimation of the market power has been of interest to economists for a long time and there is a substantial body of literature assessing the main elements of competition in various countries and industries. In principle, there are two different methodological approaches in assessing the level of market power. The first is a reduced form method proposed by Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger (1995) estimating the average Lerner index and the mark up ratio by relaxing the assumption of perfect competition. The second approach consists of the estimation of supply and demand relations, and can be complemented with input demand functions (Bresnahan, 1982) . In other words, it aims at estimating marginal cost and in addition to the Lerner index, it incorporates the elasticity of demand and the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index as parameters to be estimated.
Based on the above, the majority of these studies apply Roeger (1995) methodology in order to estimate industry markups (see Table 1 ). Most of these studies consent that mark up ratios exceed unity denoting the absence of competitive conditions in certain sectors/industries (see for example Martins et al, 1996; Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 2012; Molnar, 2010; Molnar and Bottini, 2010) . This finding constitutes a major hypothesis that is empirically tested by using different econometric techniques, such as panel data methods (fixed, random effects) or cross-section analysis, in order to asses the level of competitive conditions in an industry.
<Insert Table 1 about here> Considering the above, Martins et al, (1996) apply the Roeger (1995) approach extended to include intermediate goods, in order to estimate markups in the manufacturing industries for 14 OECD countries, over the period 1970-1992 by using the OECD STAN database. According to their findings, the estimated mark-ups are positive and statistically significant in all of the countries considered. The level of mark-ups appears to be related to the market structure of a particular industry, while there is a considerable variation of mark-ups across countries and across industries. Wu (2009) uses the data from Martins et al. (1996) and finds insignificant effects of entry barriers on mark -up ratios. Especially, the author infers that mark -up ratios are high with high entry regulated countries and sectors with entry natural barriers.
Weiss (2010) In a similar study (Molnar, 2010) , mark-up ratios are estimated using Roeger (1995) methodology for manufacturing and service industries in Slovenia at a sectoral disaggregated level. The estimation is performed for the period 1993-2006 and uses firm level data of the Amadeus database. The empirical findings consent that the estimated mark-ups are higher for services than manufacturing industries. The same results hold in the empirical study of Molnar and Bottini, (2010 Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011 , 2012a , 2012b investigate the market structure of the Greek manufacturing industry at the two-digit SIC level. These studies extend the Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) approach, in order to evaluate the degree of market power in the Greek manufacturing industries (e.g food and beverages). They consent that there is significant market power in the sectors under scrutiny.
On the contrary, Nishimura et al. (1999) , implied to a panel of 21 Japanese industries over the period 1971-1994 an alternative method based on the identity between the short-run elasticity of output to inputs, the mark-up ratio, and the factor shares. They argue that, there is a strong evidence of imperfect competition, where internationally competitive industries show low mark-ups. Moreover, they conclude that the mark-up rate differs considerably among firms and its distribution is skewed, while the markup rate over marginal cost shows strong procyclicality. 4 Maioli (2004) calculates markups for 30 French manufacturing industries over the period 1977-1997 according to two different methodologies. The first is based on the classical Solow residual approach, as adapted by Roeger (1995) , while the second jointly estimates mark ups and returns to scale. The results reveal the absence of competitive conditions since the mark up ratios are generally larger than one in both methodologies, while there is heterogeneity in the magnitude of the ratios across the manufacturing sectors. 
Data and Methodology
The approach used in this paper is based on a methodology developed by Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger (1995) . The basic insight is that the traditional Solow residual (SR) should be independent of variation in the log-change of output in the absence of monopoly power. The main contribution of Roeger (1995) is that he showed how the differences between the production-based (primal) Solow residual (SR) and the cost based (dual) Solow residual (DSR) can be used to eliminate the unobservable productivity shock in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of market power (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2012b) .
Assume that the production function which is homogenous of degree λ (returns to scale) is defined by the following neoclassical equation:
where Y is gross output, A is the multifactor productivity growth (Hicks-neutral productivity term) and there are three basic inputs in the production process. More specifically, L denotes labour, M is the intermediate inputs, and K stands for capital.
The inclusion of intermediate inputs allows defining the mark-up ratios using gross output, and hence overcoming the upward bias that would result if value added were used instead (Martins et al, 1996; Molnar and Bottini, 2010) . After log-differentiation and re-arranging we get the following equation:
where SR is the (primal) Solow residual, y, l, m and k are the first differences of the
respectively, i a is the input share of factor i and L now is the Roeger (1995) showed that an equivalent expression can be derived for the dual productivity measure (price-based Solow residual) by using the cost function associated with the production function (equation 1) as follows: 9
where w denotes the wages, p m is the price of intermediate inputs, r is the rental price of capital and p is the price of output. By subtracting (4) from (2) and assuming constant returns to scale (λ=1), a suitable expression of L can be obtained by the following interpretation:
The lower case indicates log-differentiation. 8 Due to lack of data regarding (net indirect) taxes and value added rates across industries and countries under scrutiny the estimation of mark -up ratio is possibly upward bias. 9 Under perfect competition equation (4) For the sake of simplicity the above equation can be re-written after adding a disturbance term (ε) as follows: 10
are the nominal Solow residual (Δy) and the growth rate of the nominal output/capital ratio (Δx) correspondingly.
In equation 8 k is the capital compensation at basic current prices and r is the user (rental) cost of capital. Capital compensation is derived as the value added minus labour compensation, which in turns is derived by applying the ratio of hours worked by total persons engaged to hours worked by employees to compensation. Since the database does not contain a price series for capital we have to construct it, by following the Hall and Jorgensen (1967) approach. Therefore, the rental price of capital r can be computed by the following equation:
10 Essentially,
where P i is the fixed asset investment deflator, (i-π e ) denotes the real interest rate, and δ is the depreciation rate, which is set at 5% across all sectors (Martins et al, 1996) . In other words, real interest rate is the long-term interest rate minus the expected inflation rate, which in turn is the filtered inflation rate. For P i we use the fixed capital deflator for the total economy since sector specific deflators were not available for the sample countries, (i-π e ) is the real interest rate, both taken from the AMECO database.
It is worth mentioning that different error terms are assumed for the sector-based estimation of mark-ups. As the unobservable productivity term, a cancels out with this subtraction, equation (6) is relatively easy to estimate by applying econometric techniques. The estimation of equation (2), in contrast, would result in bias and inconsistency of the mark-up estimates as the input variables are correlated with the productivity shocks (Molnar and Bottini, 2010) .
In order to perform an in depth investigation of industry competitiveness in the sample countries (Eurozone, Japan and the US), we use an extended dataset for manufacturing and services sectors at the two and four digit level (ISIC Rev. 
Empirical results
In this section we present the empirical findings of the estimation of mark -up ratios in manufacturing and services sectors in the sample countries (Eurozone, Japan and the US) over the estimated period .
The empirical results of the OLS estimation of equation 6 regarding Eurozone are shown in Table 2 . According to the empirical findings, the estimated mark -up coefficients are on average statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. Besides, the F-statistics support the jointly statistical significance of the estimated regressions, while the error terms are not correlated over time (lack of autocorrelation). Regarding the magnitude of the relevant estimates, there is significant variation but the most of the mark -up ratios are below unity, implying the presence of competitive conditions for the manufacturing and services industry in the Eurozone over the period 1970─2007. It is worth mentioning that the magnitude of the estimations does not vary significantly from the ones reported by the bootstrap 12 and 2SLS methods (23 out of 29 estimations of mark -up ratios are below unity with the 3 methods) implying that the results are quite robust. In other words, the bootstrap 11 It is noteworthy that the alternative method of computing the input factor shares by estimating the elasticities of the production function has severe problems concerning the biasness of the relevant coefficients (Basanetti et al, 2008) . 12 Bootstrap method involves estimating a model many times using simulated data. Quantities computed from the simulated data are then used to make inferences from the actual data. The estimation of the bootstrap method provides more accurate estimates of the Lerner indices and the mark-up ratios.
estimator reveals that the OLS findings are robust to any simultaneity bias between the control variables and the error terms.
Regarding the manufacturing sectors (15 to 37 two & four digit-codes), the mark-up ratios range from 0.53 (Textile, Leather and Footwear) to 1.05 (Transport equipment).
This range differs from the high mark-ups obtained in previous studies for European countries (Martins et al, 1996; Molnar and Bottini, 2010; Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 2012; Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2011 , 2012a , 2012b . Especially, Christopoulou and Vermeulen, (2012) report that in the Euro area (Germany, France Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland) the statistical significant estimated weighted average mark -up ratio is 1.37. 13 One explanation for this discrepancy is due to the adjustment for intermediate inputs. This adjustment tends to lower mark-ups substantially, in particular for sectors with a large share of intermediate input in total output (i.e rubber and plastics, pulp, paper, printing and publishing, etc).
On average, mark-up ratios in Eurozone industries appear particularly low in comparison with other OECD countries (Molnár, 2010; Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 2012; Maioli, 2004) but the average reveals differences across sectors (heterogeneity). This is not surprising given that on the one hand, sector specific characteristics affect the mark-up companies' pricing behaviour (prices above average costs), while on the other hand, the regulatory barriers (i.e legalities) vary considerably across sectors distorting the level of competition.
<Insert Table 2 
about here>
In Eurozone, the statistical significant at 5% level of mark up ratio in food, beverages and Tobacco industries (code 15t16) which accounts for large portion of the total gross output in manufacturing is below unity (0.94). This outcome contradicts with previous studies regarding independent European countries (Molnár, 2010; Polemis, 2014) , and indicates no evidence of market power in the specific sectors. Christopoulou and Vermeulen, (2012) Martins et al. (1996) and Martins and Scarpetta (1999) regarding the Food products sector (1.05), while Christopoulou and Vermeulen, (2012) report an estimated mark -up ratio of 1.19 in Food & Beverages industry and 1.51 in Tobacco industry. Roeger (1995) <Insert Table 4 
Also, the findings do support that the majority of the sectors of the US manufacturing and services industries appears to operate under competitive characteristics for the period under consideration. The statistical significant mark up ratios employed by the OLS and Bootstrap methods of estimation in food, beverages and Tobacco industries (code 15t16) which accounts for large portion of the total gross output in manufacturing is close to unity (0.93) with OLS estimation and below unity with Bootstrap method of estimation (0.74). The estimated results from both methods of estimation do not supported by Martins and Scarpetta (1999) 
Stylized facts
From the empirical findings of the previous section some stylized facts are emerged.
A first stylized fact that may be derived is that there is no evidence of imperfect competition across the majority of industries in Eurozone, US and Japan. It is evident from Tables 2, 3 and 4 that the majority of the estimated mark -up ratios are statistically significant below unity. Table 5 categorizes the sectors in Eurozone, US and Japan into competitive and less competitive ones.
<Insert Table 5 about here> A second stylized fact that may be derived is that mark -up ratios are heterogeneous across industries with services having higher mark -up ratios than manufacturing industries. Interestingly, estimated mark -up ratios are higher in services industry than in manufacturing industry. In the Eurozone the statistically significant at 5 per cent level of significance estimated mark -up ratio in total manufacturing industry is 0.88. The average mark -up ratio in services industry is 0.93 indicating that manufacturing industry is exposed more to competition than services industry. The same argument holds in US, the estimated mark -up ratio in total manufacturing industry is 0.94 and the average mark -up ratio in services industry is 0.96 as well as in Japan where the estimated mark -up ratio in total manufacturing industry is 0.99 and the average mark -up ratio in services industry is 1.09. 16 A third stylized fact that may be derived is that mark -up ratios are heterogeneous across industries and countries. It is evident from tables 2, 3 and 4 and second stylized fact that the estimated mark -up ratios in manufacturing and services industries are higher than the corresponding ratios in US which in turn are higher than the corresponding ratios in Eurozone. Therefore, Eurozone exhibits the lowest markup ratios both in manufacturing and services industries.
A fourth stylized fact that may be derived is that sectors that are more open to internationalisation, experience relatively lower mark up ratios than the ratios experienced in less open sectors to internationalisation. The textile sector is a interesting example. In Eurozone the estimated mark -up ratio is 0.53 while in Japan is 0.81. These ratios are the lowest among the estimated mark -up ratios in manufacturing industry in Japan and Eurozone. In the US the estimated ratio is 0.90 which is among the five lowest ratios in the manufacturing industry. Another interesting example is the Electrical and optical equipment sector in Eurozone and US. The estimated mark -up ratios in these two sectors are among the three and six lowest ratios in the manufacturing industry Eurozone and US respectively.
A fifth stylized fact that may be derived is that deregulated industries generally have lower mark -up ratios than regulated industries, while fragmented industries generally exhibit higher mark -up ratios than segmented ones. In Table 2 the markup ratio in Post and telecommunications industry (code 64) is 0.99 (OLS estimation), 1.14 (Bootstrap estimation) and 0.92 (2SLS estimation). These estimated mark -up ratios are close to unity and depict no competitive pressures in the specific industry. Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012) have stated that the mark -up ratio in the same industry in the Euro area over the period 1980 -2004 is 1.48, but this ratio may not reflect the deregulation mechanism that took place in that industry recently. Taking account the latter our estimation fully reflects the dynamics of deregulation in Post and telecommunications industry across major European countries (12) over the scrutinized period. In the US the corresponding ratios are lower than the ones reported in the Eurozone indicating that the deregulation mechanism that took place there earlier has stronger effects, in terms of competition, than in the Eurozone.
In addition, the mark -up ratio in Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel (code 23) ranges from 0.94 (OLS estimation) to 1.37 (Bootstrap estimation). The latter estimate clearly depicts the existence of major players in the wholesale oil market and the possible fragmentation of that industry (Polemis and Fotis 2013; 2014, Martins and Scarpetta 1999) . The same argument holds in the US, even though the magnitude of the estimated ratio is lower it is supported by the three methods of estimation, but the same cannot be argued in favour of the corresponding industry in Japan since the empirical findings are not robust.
Conclusions and policy implications
The To sum up, our analysis will be a useful policy tool to achieve structural microeconomic goals in light of the existing financial crisis. Firstly, given the primarily indications regarding the high mark -up ratios in selected industries in manufacturing and services industries, a suitable ex ante policy is linked with a thorough investigation of mergers and acquisitions. Secondly, in order to enhance the level of internationalisation in manufacturing, the government could pursue horizontal strategies focusing on the further opening of the markets.
Given the above considerations, our analysis can be further extended in order to tackle a number of constraints which may be addressed in future work. An analysis using more disaggregated firm level data may enrich our conclusions. Given the validity of the econometric results, the mark up ratios may be improved with the addition of new parameters especially those regarding price formulation. Furthermore, as more information and data become available, especially at the firm level, and more companies enter the sample, more in-depth analysis should be made in order to examine aspects that are not covered by the existing database, since it may not collect information from all the new small entrants. Such a consideration will better capture the dynamism of the manufacturing and services industries and lead the research to further outcomes on developing a consumer policy.
Finally, the methodology applied could be further refined, by estimating the input coefficients of the production function (shares) or by incorporating the role of returns to scale in the estimation of mark -up ratios. These are important issues and remain the subject of future research. a) The markup ratios are generally larger than one. b) Average markups are heterogenous across countries. c) Markups are heterogeneous across sectors, with services having higher markups on average than manufacturing. d) Services sectors generally have higher markups in the euro area than the US, whereas the pattern is the reverse for manufacturing. Molnar, (2010) Slovenia. 37 manufacturing and service sectors 1993 -2006 Roeger (1995 / OLS in panel fixed effects a) The mark-ups are high in some industries, such as real estate and food and beverages. b) Mark-ups also appeared high in transport, catering and professional services, c) Mark-ups are lower for most manufacturing industries, traded services and other industries (i.e construction, computer services and retail and wholesale trade). a) The Greek manufacturing and services industries operate in non-competitive conditions. B) Average mark-up ratios are heterogenous across sectors, with manufacturing having higher mark ups on average than services. c) The mark up ratios in the manufacturing sectors are on average higher in the post European Union (EU) accession period (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) , as a result of the merger wave in the manufacturing industry. d) This upward trend stopped within the period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , and the relevant ratios have decreased substantially.
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